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I. INTRODUCTION
European monetary integration is in many ways an unparalleled event. For the first 
time in history, a group of democratic countries freely agreed to forego their monetary 
sovereignty. Even more unprecedented is the fact that some of them chose to ratify the treaty 
leading to the abandonment of their national currency by referendum. In other words some 
European countries chose to directly let their people make the decision to replace their 
national currencies by the euro. Among others, France did so, on 20 September 1992.
The existence of referenda is in general a godsend for the scientific community, 
because they are not only opportunities for politicians to check the electorate’s mindset, but 
also the closest to a real life-size experiment social scientists can dream of. The results of such 
polls have therefore attracted a lot of attention from researchers, and economists in particular, 
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so as to tally the vested interests in the issues addressed by those referenda. Needless to say, 
although the referenda that benefited from a systematic investigation were devoted to issues 
so diverse as trade policy, as in Weck-Hanneman (1990), or the participation of the US in the 
Gold Standard, as in Eichengreen (1995), European integration recently attracted a special 
attention. Thus, Vlachos (2004) focused on the results of the Swedish EU-membership 
referendum. Doyle and Fidrmuc (2006) also studied voters’ behaviour in referenda about EU-
membership but concentrated on candidate countries. Related studies, such as Gärtner (1997) 
or Gabel and Palmer (1995), provided similar analyses using survey data on public support for 
European integration.
Those papers, though insightful, share a common drawback. That is, by studying the 
support for EU integration, be it in referenda or in surveys, they end up studying an issue that 
is, to say the least, multi-faceted. Jonung’s (2004) analysis of the Swedish referendum on 
EMU stands as an exception, but relies mostly on exit polls instead of true votes, and only 
performs casual descriptions of bivariate associations. The aim of the present paper is 
precisely to focus on the more specific issue of monetary integration. The paper’s basic 
presumption is therefore that the French referendum was in essence a referendum on 
monetary integration. In other words, it assumes that the way voters cast their votes in the 
French referendum was for the most part driven by the impact of the adoption of a European 
single currency on their well-being. As will be argued below, this assumption is warranted, 
because the public debate in France mainly revolved around the issue of monetary integration. 
Namely, the costs and benefits of relinquishing monetary independence were central to the 
discussions that surrounded the poll. Therefore, comparing the results of the referendum 
among French departments may help to assess the impact of monetary union on voters’ 
welfare, and to distinguish the key characteristics that shape voters’ support for EMU.1
Another specificity of the present paper is that, unlike previous studies like 
Méon (2002) or Mixon and Tyrone (2004), it not only analyses the share of favourable 
answers in the referendum but also the abstention rate. Participation in the referendum may 
indeed be instructive because it reflects the strength of the interests related to monetary 
integration. This additional information has only rarely been analysed so far. In the present 
paper, the abstention rate is therefore studied jointly with the share of yes-votes to determine 
to what extent they were influenced by considerations pertaining to monetary integration.
1
 In France, départements are the most important administrative units between municipalities and regions.
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That analysis may then cast a new light on three distinct strands of the literature. First, 
it relates to the general literature on the political economy of monetary integration. Relevant 
theoretical arguments can be found in Giovannini (1993), Frieden (1991, 1994), or 
Eichengreen (1995). The latter also provided an empirical contribution to that literature by 
analysing the voting pattern in the 1896 U.S. presidential election on the assumption that its 
main issue was the participation of the United States in the Gold standard. Second, the present 
paper is also naturally related to the literature on European integration. It thus extends the 
existing literature on the support for the process of European integration by focusing on one 
of its specific aspects. In so doing, it may shed some light on the distributive implications of 
EMU, thereby possibly providing some advice as to the policy measures likely to ease the 
process. It also has shorter-term clear political implications after the French and Dutch 2005 
rejection of the European Constitutional Treaty, and insofar as more referenda on monetary 
union are ahead in the UK, Sweden, Denmark, or in new members of the EU. Third, this piece 
of work is also connected to the research on the theory of voting and abstention. It should in 
particular help weighing the importance of issue-specific and structural determinants of the 
turnout rate.
With this end in view, the rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section 
describes in which context the referendum was held, and argues that the issue of monetary 
integration was central to the public debate preceding the poll. Section 3 discusses the 
theoretical determinants of the approval and abstention rates. Section 4 describes the 
econometric specification that is employed, as well as the data set on which it is applied. 
Section 5 displays and comments the results of our estimations. Section 6 concludes.
II. THE CONTEXT OF THE REFERENDUM
Before turning to the analysis of the determinants of the vote and abstention in the 
referendum, it is necessary to put it into perspective and to recall the context in which it was 
held. The importance of the issue of monetary union in the public debate will then appear 
more clearly.
1. Some history
The Treaty on European Union, also known as the Maastricht Treaty, is the result of 
the negotiations that were closed with the forty-sixth European summit, held in Maastricht, 
Netherlands, on December 9 and 10, 1991. That treaty made provision for the evolution of the 
then European Economic Community in the political and economic fields. In particular, it 
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paved the way to European monetary union. It was signed on February 7, 1992, but had to be 
ratified in all member countries by the end of that year to come into full force. In France, 
François Mitterrand, the French president, opted for a referendum to ratify the treaty, although 
there was no formal requirement to do so. The poll was planned for September 20, 1992. The 
official electoral campaign accordingly took place between September 7 and September 19.
The campaign’s economic context was marked by the EMS crisis that was partly 
ignited by the uncertainties pertaining to the ERM’s future. The last days preceding the vote 
had proved particularly troubled. Namely, on September 16, the Spanish peseta had been 
devalued, while the pound Sterling and the Italian lira, that had already left the ERM, had 
markedly depreciated. In an attempt to defend the French franc, the French central bank had 
had to raise the daily interest rate to twenty percent, only two days before the poll.
From a political point of view, the Danish referendum had preceded the French one. It 
had delivered a negative decision, thereby dramatizing the French poll, not to mention that the 
Danish result was in part responsible in the stress on the EMS. Moreover, the issue of the 
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty had cut through traditional French political lines. 
Namely, only three parties had taken a unanimous stand: on either extremes of the political 
spectrum, the Communist Party and the National Front firmly opposed ratification, while on 
the centre former president Valéry Giscard d’Estaing’s Union pour la Démocratie Française 
(UDF), a traditional pro-European party, defended it.
Other parties were divided. Thus, on the right, future president Jacques Chirac’s neo-
gaullist Rassemblement Pour la République (RPR) was split between partisans and opponents 
of a yes-vote. The former were led by future Prime Minister Edouard Balladur, while the 
latter followed Charles Pasqua and Philippe Séguin. On the left, the Socialist Party, following 
François Mitterrand, clearly supported the treaty. However, that party’s official stance caused 
some of its members to secede around Jean-Pierre Chevènement, who took advantage of it to 
become the herald of left-leaning eurosceptics. Finally, the situation was even more complex 
in the two green parties. One of them, Génération Ecologie, which lost influence soon 
afterwards, supported the ratification, while the other one took no position at all, as a result of 
not being able to find an agreement among its leaders. That situation made the results of the 
referendum particularly unpredictable.
Unsurprisingly, the results proved close, with the treaty being ratified by a hair’s 
breadth.2 More precisely, 51.04% of voters voted “yes” while the opponents of the ratification 
2
 This was however unexpected at the time, as De Boissieu and Pisani-Ferry (1998) or Franklin et al. (1994) 
recall.
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5
gathered 48.95% of expressed votes. However, significant heterogeneity was observed among 
departments. Namely, yes-votes scored highest in Bas-Rhin with 68.59%, while Somme 
proved to be the most eurosceptic department with only 44.92% of yes-votes. Similarly, 
abstention rates differed markedly from one department to another. Thus 44.92% of voters did 
not turnout in Haute Corse whereas abstainers were only 24.23% in Dordogne. This is 
precisely those heterogeneities that will be exploited in the rest of the paper.
2. Monetary union as the key issue of the referendum
The central assumption of the present analysis is that voters were influenced, at least 
partly, by considerations pertaining to monetary union. To be sure, EMU was not the sole 
provision of the Maastricht treaty, since it also regulated the Community’s common foreign 
policy, and justice. Moreover, non-economic considerations were not absent from voters’ 
preoccupations. Thus, de Boissieu and Pisani-Ferry (1998) mention an exit poll according to 
which the “loss of national sovereignty”, “Brussels technocrats”, and “German dominance” 
were the chief motives put forward by voters who claimed they had voted against ratification. 
Similarly, partisans of the treaty put forward “peace”, the “building of Europe”, and the “need 
to withstand competition with Japan and the United States” as their main motivations.
Nevertheless, it can be convincingly argued that, at least in the French case, the debate 
over monetary union was at least one of the key issues that shaped the results of the 
referendum. Thus, Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) compare the debate preceding the 
referendum to a “public seminar” on the relationship between common policies and national 
economic performance. Moreover, opponents to the treaty concentrated their criticisms on 
monetary union, presented as an unacceptable loss of sovereignty. This was true of right-
oriented leaders, such as Philippe Séguin, as well as of left-leaning leaders, like Jean-Pierre 
Chevènement.
There is furthermore strong evidence that economic issues related to the process of 
European integration receive in general considerable attention in the media. Thus, Eichenberg 
and Duval (1986) observe that the 60% of the news coverage of European integration in Great 
Britain involved economic issues. While such a statistic is not available for France, one must 
admit that a glance at the French press reveals a dominance of economic issues in the news 
related to the EU. More to the point, one must recall that the EMS crisis had started in the 
summer of 1992 and was going through renewed fury at the time of the campaign for the 
referendum. That crisis therefore gave monetary issues strong priority in the public debate. 
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6
There is consequently little doubt that French voters were well aware of the monetary 
implications of the referendum.
Another argument emphasizing the weight of monetary issues in the referendum is the 
fact that other economic dimensions of the process of European integration were not at stake. 
Thus, the Maastricht treaty contains no reference to the Common agricultural policy, or to the 
structural and cohesion funds. The magnitude of intra-European public transfers was therefore 
to remain unchanged regardless of the result of the referendum. Moreover, the European 
single market had been completed at the time the treaty was signed, and its existence was not 
jeopardized. The 1992 referendum can therefore only be compared with great caution to the 
referenda on EU-membership held in applicant countries and studied by Doyle and 
Fidrmuc (2006), because their scope was significantly larger. Therefore, beside institutional 
and symbolic issues, monetary union was by far the most salient issue in the French 
referendum.
III. FACTORS BOUND TO INFLUENCE THE VOTE AND THE DECISION TO VOTE
The previous section put forward that monetary union played a prominent role in the 
referendum on the TEU. Understanding the results of that referendum therefore implies 
determining how that issue affected voters’ choice to cast a “yes” or “no” ballot, as well as 
their decision to participate in the poll. As the analysis is carried out at the level of 
departments, this ultimately means relating departments’ characteristics to the share of ‘yes’ 
votes and the participation rate. We must therefore list a set of determinants of voters’ attitude 
towards monetary union that may be measured, or proxied, at the departmental level. In what 
follows, we focus on the economic implications of monetary union, expressly leaving aside
attitudinal factors, such as partisan identifications, political opinions, or general posture 
towards European integration. We motivate that choice in the first sub-section. The two 
subsequent sub-sections are devoted to the expected determinants of voting behaviour and 
abstention, respectively.
1. A focus on economic characteristics
The first motivation of the choice to refrain from using attitudinal variables is that, as 
argued above, the role of partisan affiliations was bound to be limited by the fact that most 
parties were divided on the issue at stake. Second, as Doyle and Fidrmuc (2006) argue, the 
correlation between attitudes and voting behaviour is not very informative, in spite of its usual 
statistical significance. In the context of our study, observing a correlation between, for 
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7
instance, the proportion of respondents of the Eurobarometer survey who declared themselves 
supporters of European integration in a department and the share of “yes” votes in that 
department would not reveal much, bar the fact that voters tend to vote according to their 
opinion. What matters indeed, are the underlying factors that determine voters’ opinions.
Furthermore, as Frieden (1994) puts it, what we usually refer to as ideology is not 
necessarily a black box, but something that can be explained by more fundamental factors, 
where economic considerations play a key part. As an example, he further argues that the 
same notion of “national pride” is ironically sometimes used in some countries to oppose 
devaluations, while it is pretext to criticizing the national currency’s overvaluation in others.
Third, it can be argued that the causality between attitude and votes is unclear. Thus, 
Wlezien et al. (1997) observe that causality may well run from vote choice to attitudinal
variables. We therefore exclude attitudinal factors from our analysis and focus on economic 
characteristics in this study.
This choice can be further defended on the ground that economic variables are known 
to impact citizens’ opinion or voting behaviour. For instance, Eichenberg and Dalton (1993), 
Gärtner (1997), or Erlandsson (2002) observe a significant impact of economic evolutions on 
the support for European integration, as measured by the Eurobarometer survey. Regarding 
actual referenda, a significant and theoretically sensible influence of economic factors on 
votes is reported by Weck-Hanneman (1990), Eichengreen (1995), Vlachos (2004), and Doyle 
and Fidrmuc (2006). Strikingly, whereas Vlachos (2004) and Doyle and Fidrmuc (2006) focus 
on European membership, only the studies of Eichengreen (1995) and Jonung (2004) are 
devoted to the more specific issue of monetary integration as such. However, the former’s 
focus is the late XIXth century United States, while the latter performs no econometric test.
2. The determinants of the approval rate
As regards the specific factors that may have influenced voters’ behaviour in the 1992 
referendum, four broad sets of factors are traditionally pointed out in the literature. Those are 
individual mobility, macroeconomic shocks, openness to European trade, and the sensitivity 
of voters to inflation. The first two sets of indicators stem directly from Mundell’s (1961) 
theory of optimum currency areas.
According to that theory, since monetary integration implies foregoing the 
independence of monetary policy, its cost will accrue chiefly to those areas that are more 
exposed to macroeconomic shocks. A first set of factors influencing the support for monetary 
union in a department should therefore be the characteristics that determine its exposure to 
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8
shocks. However, the same shock may have different consequences if it hits different regions 
or departments that may absorb it differently. Mundell (1961) underlines the role of the 
geographic mobility of workers as the main way to absorb those shocks. We should therefore 
expect more mobile voters to support monetary integration and vote in favour of the 
Maastricht treaty. At the level of individual voters, mobility takes another dimension, 
pertaining to the ease with which a worker who is laid off may find another job. For instance, 
an unskilled worker may find it more difficult to get a new position than a skilled worker. 
Overall, this means that the share of yes votes should be greater in departments where voters 
are more mobile, both geographically and socially.
The third factor that we take into account is openness to European trade. Arguably, 
monetary union allows a series of efficiency gains due to the reduction of uncertainty and 
transaction costs in international transactions. The benefits a voter can expect from EMU 
therefore depend on the volume of his/her transactions with other European countries. 
Moreover, Mac Kinnon (1963) showed that a greater openness to international trade would 
lower the cost of giving up the possibility to use the exchange rate to absorb asymmetric 
shocks by enhancing the flexibility of nominal wages. For those two reasons, we should 
expect greater openness to European trade to be associated with greater support for the TEU 
in French department.
The fourth factor should measure the exposure of voters to the cost of inflation. This is 
due to the specificity of EMU that implies that price stability be the chief objective of the 
European central bank. Thus Maastricht treaty’s famous article 105 stipulates that “the 
primary objective of the ESCB shall be to maintain price stability”. As inflation has many 
distributive effects, the ESCB’s strong official anti-inflationary commitment was bound to 
raise support from some voters while attracting the opposition of others. More specifically, 
voters who hold liquid assets should benefit from monetary integration, whereas those whose 
wealth consists of real assets should not be affected.
3. The determinants of the abstention rate
Whereas the rational choice model has proved useful when applied to study voters’ 
behaviour in the voting booth, it has run into the “paradox of not voting” when used to 
understand voters’ participation. The rationale of that paradox is that the probability of 
influencing the result of an election is so close to zero that no voter should find it optimal to 
vote, however small the cost of doing so may be. This conclusion not only blatantly 
contradicts empirical observations, but should also prevent any attempt to link participation 
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9
and economic phenomena. However, several arguments surveyed by Dhillon and 
Peralta (2002) or Feddersen (2004) have been used by vote theorists to overcome that 
difficulty.
The first possibility, put forward by Riker and Ordeshook (1968), is to directly assume 
that voters get a consumption benefit from voting. This consumption benefit should help 
compensate at least partly the cost of voting. Therefore, participation should be positive but 
also depend on the importance of the election in the eyes of voters. Another strand of 
explanations of turnout behaviour rests on the assumption that some party or faction leaders 
can spend resources on mobilizing the electorate, as in Shachar and Nalebuff (1999). The 
importance of the vote for those leaders determines the volume of resources spent on that 
mobilization effort. Finally, group-based ethical models, such as Harsanyi (1977), contend 
that voters assess the result of a vote not only by the mere result of the vote but also by the 
number of voters that took part in that vote. One may moreover add that the legitimacy of an 
election, and most of all of a referendum, is usually measured not only by the margin of the 
result but also by the rate of participation. A casual glance at the media coverage of the 2004 
election of the members of the European Parliament should suffice to convince the sceptical 
reader of the empirical relevance of this argument.
All those theoretical arguments have the same implication for the issue at hand in this 
paper. Namely, voters’ participation in the referendum should depend on the same factors as 
those that influence their voting behaviour. Indeed, those theories explain why the cost of 
voting should usually not deter all voters from turning out. However, the decision to turnout 
should ultimately depend on each voter’s overall assessment of the importance of his/her vote, 
which in turn depends on the issue at stake. Conversely, each voter’s net benefit from voting 
depends on the cost of voting he/she faces. Therefore, one should complement the set of 
factors already mentioned by a measure of the cost of voting. Since such a statistic is bound to 
be very difficult to gauge directly, a solution is to estimate it through each department’s 
average turnout rate in other elections. In the empirical analysis, we therefore add a measure 
of average abstention in each department to the set of explanatory variables mentioned above.
Another justification of the inclusion of average abstention among explanatory 
variables stems from the psycho/sociological approaches of the act of voting. Those 
approaches emphasize the role of structural factors over contextual factors mentioned above 
in shaping turnout rates. Opp (2001) for instance argues that the decision to vote is motivated 
by an overestimation of one’s personal influence on the election’s outcome, in addition to 
moral and social incentives. Empirically, those factors may be captured by average abstention. 
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More recent contributions that depart from the assumption of perfect rationality point toward 
the same direction. For instance, Demichelis and Dhillon (2001) have thus used learning 
models of behaviour. An interesting feature of their model is that they could generate 
hysteresis in the turnout rate. Abstention rates should therefore be correlated across elections.
IV. METHODOLOGY AND DATA
Before describing the data on which it was applied, this section presents the general 
econometric strategy employed in the analysis.
1. The empirical strategy
The analysis is performed at the level of departments. This allows to use a sufficient 
number of observations for a meaningful regression analysis, while resulting in a tolerable 
data constraint. The variables to be explained are the approval rate and the rate of abstention 
in each department. As those variables are by construction bounded, our regressions are based 
on a logit model. Accordingly we do not directly use the approval rate nor the rate of 
abstention as the dependent variable, but transform them in unbounded variables. More 
precisely, the general specification of our equations, respectively for the share of yes-votes 
and for the rate of abstention is the following:
logyesi  ln (yes votesi / no votesi) = a1 + a2 Xi + ui (1a)
logabsi  ln (abstainersi / registered votersi) = b1 + b2 Yi + vi (1b)
Where Xi and Yi are vectors of department i's characteristics. ui and vi are error terms.
As the basic units of the analysis are aggregate observations, we can resort to an OLS 
method to estimate the logit model. However, the error term is heteroskedastic. To balance 
that heteroskedasticity phenomenon, Maddala (1983) proposes to use the minimum chi-square 
method, where each observation is multiplied by the following weight, in estimation (1a) and 
(1b) respectively:
wyesi = [ yes votesi × ( 1  yes votesi / total votesi )]½ (2a)
wabsi = [ abstainersi × ( 1  abstainersi / registered votersi )]½ (2b)
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Moreover, as both equations refer to two successive decisions, namely the decision to 
vote and the vote itself, observed in the same departments, residuals ui and vi may be 
correlated. To take advantage of that property, relationships (1a) and (1b) were consequently 
estimated jointly thanks to the SURE method.
2. Data
All French mainland departments were used in the computations. Corsican and 
overseas departments were excluded, because of both their institutional peculiarities and 
specific data limitations. Overall, this left us with 93 departments for which the data described 
below could be gathered.
Both left-hand-side variables were computed from the results published in Le Monde, 
on September 22nd, 1992. Since that newspaper is an evening paper, the printed results were 
those announced by the ministry of the Interior, and not simple survey results. Abstention in 
other elections were obtained from the same source. More precisely, we used the two 
presidential elections preceding and following the Maastricht referendum, namely the second 
rounds of the 1988 and 1995 polls. We chose to gauge average abstention using those 
elections because, in the French system, presidential elections are the only ones that are held 
at the national level, like referenda. Moreover, the Maastricht referendum occurred 
approximately halfway between the two presidential elections, which is a desirable feature of 
those polls.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Mean Std. deviation Minimum Maximum
Yes 50.178 5.335 41.06 68.59
Abstention 28.41 2.28 24.23 34.33
Average abstention 16.56 2.07 10.97 23.19
Same department 84.62 5.13 70.20 93.40
Mortgage 19.08 9.03 6.73 75.95
Unemployment 10.21 2.14 5.80 15.90
No degree 26.82 3.60 18.07 34.32
Long-term unemployment 26.68 4.65 16.10 34.60
EC-trade 0.67 0.11 0.36 0.90
Liquidities 79.73 31.53 19.63 313.16
Agriculture 0.081 0.052 0.0002 0.25
Naturalized Frenchmen 0.029 0.019 0.003 0.079
The first explanatory variable is intended to measure the importance of 
macroeconomic shocks in each department. That characteristic is assessed by the 
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unemployment rate of the third quarter of 1992 (unemployment), that was kindly put at our 
disposal by INSEE, the French national institute of statistics.
The second set of right-hand-side variables assesses geographic mobility, and was 
drawn from two sources. The first source is the 1990 census as provided by INSEE. It directly 
measures the share of the population that has been living in the same department for at least 
ten years (same department). The second source originates from the French central bank that 
let us use its local and regional financial statistics dataset. We extracted per capita outstanding 
mortgages (mortgage) to measure geographical mobility. The interpretation of that variable is 
that voters with outstanding mortgages have recently acquired their residence, and therefore 
do not intend to move out in the short run. It should therefore be interpreted as a measure of 
geographic immobility.
We expect those indicators to be negatively correlated with the approval rate, since 
more immobile voters should be more exposed to macroeconomic shocks. One may 
nevertheless contend that those indicators indeed take past mobility into account. 
Accordingly, they may as well reflect workers’ true mobility as their past fortune of not 
having had to move because of adverse shocks. If voters form their opinions on the basis of 
their past experiences, the sign of the relationship between those indicators and the approval 
rate may then be reversed. The empirical analysis that follows should help establish the 
relevant interpretation of those variables.
To complement the assessment of the sensitivity of voters to shocks, we supplement 
geographic mobility by two measures of social mobility. We thus include the rate of long-
term unemployment (long-term unemployment), defined as the share of the unemployed who 
have remained jobless for more than a year, and the share of the population that has no degree 
(no degree) in the set of explanatory variables. Both variables were drawn from the 1990 
census.
Openness to European trade, defined as the ratio of EC imports and exports to total 
trade (EC-trade), is computed thanks to the database that the French customs put at our 
disposal. Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) used a similar ratio in their cross-country study of the 
support for European integration. In his study of the Swedish referendum on EU-membership, 
Vlachos (2004) also included such a variable. We expect that ratio to be positively correlated 
with the approval rate.
To proxy voters’ sensitivity to inflation, we add per capita individual liquid savings 
(liquidities) to our explanatory variables. That statistic comes form the Banque de France’s 
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local and regional credit database. It is expected to be positively associated with the approval 
rate.
Finally, we complement our set of explanatory variables with two control variables. 
The first one is the share of gainful employees in agriculture in each department (agriculture). 
The motivation for the inclusion of that variable is that French farmers had regularly voiced 
their discontent with European integration and the Common agricultural policy. They may 
therefore have rejected the treaty on the rebound. Moreover, common wisdom about the 
results of the referendum was that more agricultural departments had tended to vote against 
ratification of the treaty. However, as Frieden (1991) stressed, farmers are also producers of 
tradable goods, and may therefore benefit from the elimination of intra-EC exchange-rate 
uncertainty.3
The second control variable included among the regressors is a dummy variable 
accounting for the existence of a frontier between the department studied and European 
country (border). This variable is set equal to one when such a variable exists and otherwise 
takes the value zero. This variable controls the positive, or negative, effect that the proximity 
of other Europeans may have on the approval rate in the referendum. One may also view that 
dummy as complementing the intra-EC trade variable, which, according to the French 
customs themselves, is not perfectly accurate.
V. RESULTS
This section presents the main findings of our estimations, and provides an assessment 
of their significance, followed by robustness checks.
1. Findings
We ran several regressions following the method described above. According to the 
SURE method, we estimated the relationships by pair. Namely, the relationship for the 
approval rate and the one for the abstention rate were estimated jointly with the same set of 
right-hand-side variables. However, a SURE estimation would be equivalent to a simple OLS 
estimation if the sets of regressors were the same in both relationships. The inclusion of the 
average abstention rate on the right-hand-side of the abstention relationship in all estimations 
3
 In line with Frieden’s (1991) argument, stands a survey commissioned by the « Mouvement des citoyens », a 
private pro-European association (Institut Louis Harris, 1993). According to that survey, in 1993, 81% of French 
farmers declared that they viewed the fluctuations of the French franc vis-à-vis other European currencies as 
detrimental to their activity. More to the point, 72% of French farmers stated that they were favourable to the 
adoption of a common currency.
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avoids this drawback. From system of regressions (1) to (4), the other sets of variables were 
entered consecutively in the estimations. Control variables are taken into account in systems 
(5) and (6), while system (7) limits the set of explanatory variables to those that exhibited a 
significant coefficient in previous regressions.
Table 2
Determinants of the approval and abstention rates in the referendum
Weighted SURE estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
yes abstention yes abstention yes abstention yes abstention
Intercept 0.0636
(0.21)
1.63
(11.51)
***
0.33
(1.13)
1.61
(10.7)
***
0.31
(1.04)
1.68
(11.09)
***
0.578
(1.79)
*
1.55
(11.32)
***
Average
abstention
0.0325
(8.81)
***
0.0336
(8.52)
***
0.035
(8.94)
***
0.043
(12.07)
***
Same 
department
0.00464
(1.32)
0.00362
(2.66)
***
0.02
(4.63)
***
0.0034
(1.73)
*
0.0202
(4.62)
***
0.00305
(1.58)
0.0216
(4.96)
***
0.00125
(0.72)
Mortgage 0.00929
(4.89)
***
0.00071
(0.99)
0.00647
(3.98)
***
0.00084
(1.12)
0.00637
(3.85)
***
0.00063
(0.85)
0.0137
(3.42)
***
0.00867
(5.05)
***
Unemployment 0.047
(5.38)
***
0.00145
(0.44)
0.0329
(4.29)
***
0.00179
(0.48)
0.0339
(4.16)
***
0.000233
(0.06)
0.0332
(4.15)
***
0.00267
(0.80)
No degree 0.029
(5.66)
***
0.00201
(0.85)
0.0282
(5.01)
***
0.00393
(1.57)
0.0253
(4.42)
***
0.00651
(2.87)
***
Long-term
unemployment
0.0136
(2.49)
**
0.00151
(0.58)
0.0137
(2.49)
**
0.00185
(0.73)
0.012
(2.2)
**
0.00156
(0.70)
EC-trade 0.062
(0.37)
0.152
(2.04)
**
0.0164
(0.10)
0.0913
(1.36)
Liquidities 0.00222
(2.0)
**
0.00238
(5.04)
***
System 
weighted R2
Number of 
observations
0.441
93
0.547
93
0.559
93
0.644
93
The figures in parentheses below the estimated coefficients are the t-values. An asterisk means that the variable 
has a significant influence at the 90% level of confidence (two asterisks: 95%, three asterisks: 99%). R2 is the 
coefficient of determination.
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Table 3
Determinants of the approval and abstention rates in the referendum
Weighted SURE estimates
(5) (6) (7) (8)
yes abstention yes abstention yes abstention yes abstention
Constant 0.621
(2.00)
**
1.615
(11.62)
***
0.485
(1.42)
1.472
(10.31)
***
0.642 
(2.22) 
 
1.46 
(17.46) 
 
0.568
(1.99)
**
0.688
(8.32)
***
Average
abstention
0.0466
(10.91)
***
0.0474
(11.49)
**
0.0465
(11.73)
***
Same 
department
0.0227
(5.40)
***
0.00145
(0.86)
0.0208
(4.48)
***
0.00077
(0.43)
0.0231
(5.74)
***
0.0217
(5.48)
***
Mortgage 0.0192
(4.44)
***
0.00724
(4.11)
***
0.0192
(4.41)
***
0.00742
(4.39)
***
0.0191
(4.54)
***
0.00791 
(5.14) 
 
0.0191
(4.55)
***
0.00526
(2.16)
***
Unemployment 0.027
(3.35)
***
0.00137
(0.42)
0.0264
(3.28)
***
0.00091
(0.29)
0.0255 
(3.48) 
 
0.0298
(4.13)
***
No degree 0.0286
(5.08)
***
0.00773
(3.40)
***
0.0287
(5.10)
***
0.00792
(3.64)
***
0.0286 
(5.37) 
 
0.00719 
(3.66) 
 
0.0283
(5.32)
***
0.00332
(1.07)
Long-term
unemployment
0.0146
(2.73)
***
0.00113
(0.52)
0.0133
(2.42)
**
0.00266
(1.23)
0.0163 
(3.21) 
 
0.0132
(2.65)
***
EC-trade 0.0345
(0.21)
0.00768
(1.18)
0.079
(0.47)
0.0261
(0.40)
Liquidities 0.00385
(3.17)
***
0.00194
(3.95)
***
0.00382
(3.15)
***
0.00197
(4.20)
***
0.00382 
(3.21) 
 
0.00209
(4.81)
***
0.00378
(3.19)
***
0.0016
(2.31)
**
Agriculture 1.244
(2.80)
***
0.463
(2.19)
**
1.41
(2.96)
***
0.671
(3.13)
***
1.26
(2.88)
***
0.675
(3.31)
***
1.169
(2.68)
***
0.740
(2.81)
***
Border 0.0449
(0.97)
0.0513
(2.88)
***
0.0473
(3.25)
***
0.0373
(1.62)
System 
weighted R2
Number
of observations
0.659
93
0.6748
93
0.669
93
0.52
93
The figures in parentheses below the estimated coefficients are the t-values. An asterisk means that the variable 
has a significant influence at the 90% level of confidence (two asterisks: 95%, three asterisks: 99%). R2 is the 
coefficient of determination.
Page 16 of 27
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
16
A first glance at tables (1) to (7) suggests a strong relationship between the economic 
characteristics of departments and the results of the referendum, both in terms of approval and 
abstention rate. More precisely a sizeable proportion of the explanatory variables used appear 
significantly in the regressions, and the system of equations’ explained variance reaches more 
than 66%.
That diagnosis applies chiefly to the relationships devoted to the approval rate. Thus, 
all the core variables, bar the share of intra-EC trade in total trade, enter regression (6) with a 
significant coefficient. Moreover, those signs remain consistent across specifications, and are 
not affected by the inclusion of control variables. Furthermore, their significance also remains 
unaffected by the inclusion of control variables.
A closer look at tables (1) to (7) allows to comment the estimated impact of each 
variable in more detail. Accordingly, the rate of unemployment and the variables measuring 
social mobility, in other words the share of the population with no degree and the rate of long-
term unemployed, exhibit the predicted signs.4 Namely, the rate of unemployment, the share 
of the population with no qualification, and the rate of long-term unemployment are all 
negatively related with the approval rate. Those results are consonant with Jonung’s (2004) 
observation that the probability of voting for EMU in Sweden increased with education and 
the share of the working age population that were either unemployed, on sick-leave, or on
early retirement. The finding that support for monetary integration decreases in departments 
with a less educated population is also reminiscent of the results of Doyle and Fidrmuc (2006) 
who observe that EU membership is supported by those with favourable and flexible human 
capital in new EU member countries.5
Surprisingly, the share of intra-EC trade never appears significantly in the relationship. 
Other definitions of openness to European trade, like the per capita European trade ratio, were 
also used but none performed better in the regressions. Another surprising result is the sign of 
the coefficient of per capita liquid savings, which is significantly negative. A possible, though 
admittedly daring, interpretation of this result is that more risk-averse voters may at the same 
4
 Strikingly, the result on the unemployment rate may seem at odds with the finding of Doyle and 
Fidrmuc (2004) that higher unemployment was associated with greater approval in referenda on EU accession 
held in candidate countries. One must recall however that the scope of those referenda was larger than the scope 
of the Maastricht referendum. In addition, participation in the EU does not imply, at least in the short run, 
adoption of the euro.
5
 Another interpretation can be conceived if one assumes that knowledge about the European Union increases 
with education. The negative correlation between lack of education and the share of yes votes may then be 
interpreted as a consequence of Hayo’s (1999) finding that support for European integration is correlated with 
EU knowledge.
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time hold a larger share of their savings in liquid assets and fear the unknown implications of 
monetary union.
More interesting are the coefficients of the geographic mobility variables, which are 
both consistently positive. Those coefficients both suggest that less mobile voters tended to 
approve the ratification of the Treaty on the European Union. This result points towards the 
second interpretation of those variables. Namely, instead of being measures of the intrinsic 
mobility of workers they may be measures of their past exposure to macroeconomic shocks. 
Workers who have not had to move out may feel less exposed to shocks. Moreover, workers 
who feel less likely to have to move out because of an adverse shock will be more likely to 
buy a house and get a mortgage. Therefore, if voters assess the probability of being hit by an 
adverse shock on the base of their past exposure, it is reasonable to contend that the approval 
rate will be higher in departments whose inhabitants seem less mobile at first sight. Our 
empirical results are consistent with this interpretation.
By the same token, the sign of the coefficient affecting the share of gainful employees 
in the agricultural sector is not as extraordinary as it may first seem, in spite of popular 
accounts of the results of the referendum. Indeed, the fact that departments where the share of 
gainful employees in agriculture is larger tended to vote in favour of the ratification is 
consistent with the presentation of that sector as a producer of tradable goods. According to 
Frieden (1991) they should therefore support monetary integration, which is consistent with 
our empirical results.
Finally, the contiguity of the department with another country does not seem to be 
related to the approval rate. That control variable was therefore ineffective in explaining the 
approval rate.
As regards the estimation of the relationship of the abstention rate with the 
characteristics of departments, the results may look more disappointing than for the approval 
rate. To be precise, fewer explanatory core variables related to monetary integration appear 
significant. Thus, the share of the population that has been living in the same department for 
the last ten years, the unemployment rate, and the long-term unemployment rate, which are 
significant in the approval rate relationships, appear insignificant in the abstention rate 
relationships. On the other hand contiguity with the border is significantly associated with the 
rate of abstention, whereas it is insignificant in the other relationship.
However, four variables that appear in the approval rate relationships also appear 
significantly in the abstention relationships. This is the case of per capita outstanding 
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mortgage and the share of the population with no degree, which both appear significantly 
negatively correlated with abstention.6 Finally, both liquid savings and the share of 
employment in the agricultural sector appear with a positive and significant sign in the 
relationship.
It must be admitted that finding an economic interpretation for those results may turn 
out knotty. Ad hoc attitudinal explanations would probably sound more convincing. However, 
doing so would go beyond the scope of this paper, and we prefer to let the reader find 
interpretations of his/her own. Nevertheless, the disappointing performance of economic 
variables in explaining the rate of abstention is indeed not unexpected. The fact that 
participation is a challenge to the rational theory of voting was emphasized in the previous 
section. Moreover previous studies, such a Weck-Hanneman (1990), have also shown that the 
power of economic variables to predict abstention is significantly smaller than their capacity 
to explain votes themselves. Matsusaka and Palda (1999) obtained similar results in 
explaining turnout decision at the individual level using issue-specific variables. Doyle and 
Fidrmuc (2006) also remark that different considerations may drive voting behaviour and 
participation in referenda on EU-integration.
More to the point, our study provides a positive result, which points out to the 
secondary role of contextual variables in shaping the turnout rate. Thus, it appears that the 
average rate of abstention, computed over the two closest national elections surrounding the 
Maastricht referendum, is overwhelmingly significant. Moreover, removing that variable from 
the set of explanatory variables results in a spectacular drop in the system of equations’ share 
of explained variance, as the comparison of estimations (7) and (8) shows.7 This result 
contrasts with Matsusaka and Palda’s (1999) who observed that past abstention rates, though 
significantly correlated with present turnout had a very limited explanatory power.8
A possible implication of this finding is that the factors determining abstention are to a 
great extent structural and must therefore be found outside the scope of the question at stake 
in the referendum. One may also remark that this finding is consistent with turnout models 
that are based on learning. The high explanatory power of average abstention rates would thus 
6
 Opp (2001) also observed a positive impact of education on participation.
7
 In addition to being estimated in a SURE model, abstention equations (7) and (8) were estimated on their own. 
It results that the adjusted R2 dropped from 66.05% to 11.88% between the two regressions. In other words, 
dropping average abstention from the set of explanatory variables results in a 54.17 percentage point drop in the 
explained variance of the abstention rate. Moreover, average abstention explains up to 48% of the variance of 
abstention observed in the referendum in a simple bivariate regression.
8
 They however contended that using aggregate abstention figures, as we do here, instead of individual 
observations may raise the share of variance explained by past abstention.
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be the result of some learning process on the part of voters, leading to a strong persistence of 
abstention.
2. Robustness checks
A first concern with our results was that they may be driven by the collinearity of 
some explanatory variables. It can in particular be argued that the unemployment rate, the 
long-term unemployment rate, and the share of the population that holds no degree should be 
correlated. To make sure that this is not the case, we ran each estimation anew while dropping 
in turn the three variables that can be suspected of being collinear, taking estimation (7) as a 
benchmark. The results of those estimations are displayed in table 5.
The results of those estimations clearly suggest that multicollinearity is not the driving 
force of our results. Indeed, all coefficients remain significant, the only exception being the 
share of gainful employees in agriculture, which only fails to be significant in estimation (10) 
in the equation that explains the approval rate. Moreover, it appears that the magnitude of 
those coefficients remains stable across specifications. Multicollinearity therefore does not 
appear to be an issue in our estimations.9
A second concern was the measurement of geographic mobility. As a key result of our 
estimations is that past immobility is positively associated with the approval rate, this issue 
required closer scrutiny. We therefore complemented the set of explanatory variables by an 
alternative measure of mobility, namely the share of French citizens who had been 
naturalized, as provided by the 1990 census. This variable was first simply added to the set of 
explanatory variables. We then dropped insignificant variables. The results of that test are 
displayed in column (12) of table 5. They show that the share of naturalized Frenchmen was 
not correlated to the share of yes vote. However, it was significantly correlated with the 
abstention rate. However, the same estimation reveals that adding the share of French 
nationals that had been naturalized to the set of explanatory variables has little effect on the 
coefficients of the variables that already appeared significantly in estimation (7). However, in 
both equations, the share of the population that has been living in the same department for at 
least ten years becomes insignificant. On the other hand, the unemployment rate and the long-
term unemployment rate now turn out significant in the expression of the abstention rate.
9 It should also be noted that the coefficient of correlation between any two of those variables, although always 
significant, never exceeds 0.45 (0.27 between unemployment and long-term unemployment, 0.21 between 
unemployment and the share of population that has no qualification, and 0.44 between long-term unemployment 
and the share of the population that has no qualification).
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Table 4
Determinants of the approval and abstention rates in the referendum
Weighted SURE estimates
(9) (10) (11)
yes abstention yes abstention yes abstention
Constant 0.855
(2.85)
***
1.476
(17.68)
***
1.0786
(3.51)
***
1.602
(20.99)
***
0.275
(0.99)
1.458
(17.30)
***
Average
abstention
0.0474
(12.00
***
0.0444
(11.20
***
0.0463
(11.55
***
Same 
department
0.0252
(5.96)
***
0.0209
(4.78)
***
0.0149
(4.59)
***
Mortgage 0.0207
(4.64)
***
0.00798
(5.18)
***
0.0247
(5.29)
***
0.00581
(3.79)
***
0.0206
(4.62)
***
0.00792
(5.14)
***
Unemployment 0.0314
(4.02)
***
0.0330
(4.51)
***
No degree 0.0324
(5.86)
***
0.00724
(3.69)
***
0.0296
(5.34)
***
0.00715
(3.64)
***
Long-term
unemployment
0.0221
(4.31)
***
0.0180
(3.26)
***
Liquidities 0.00434
(3.47)
***
0.00201
(4.85)
***
0.00509
(3.82)
***
0.00159
(3.60)
***
0.00396
(3.21)
***
0.00209
(4.82)
***
Agriculture 1.738
(3.94)
***
0.699
(3.43)
***
0.701
(1.44)
0.475
(2.31)
**
1.0364
(2.31)
**
0.665
(3.25)
***
Border 0.0459
(3.15)
***
0.0428
2.89
***
0.0456
3.10
***
System
weighted R2
Number
of observations
0.6487
93
0.6230
93
0.6496
93
The figures in parentheses below the estimated coefficients are the t-values. An asterisk means that the variable 
has a significant influence at the 90% level of confidence (two asterisks: 95%, three asterisks: 99%). R2 is the 
coefficient of determination.
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Table 5
Determinants of the approval and abstention rates in the referendum
Weighted SURE estimates
(12) (13) (14)
yes abstention yes abstention yes abstention
Constant 0.595
(2.05)
**
1.585
(18.75)
***
0.776
(4.92)
***
1.584
(18.75)
***
1.592
(3.80)
***
1.529
(13.46)
***
Average
abstention
0.0220
(5.45)
***
0.0473
(12.71)
***
0.0470
(12.61)
***
0.0458
(8.44)
***
Same 
department
0.0318
(5.82)
***
Mortgage 0.0193
(4.57)
***
0.00755
(5.10)
***
0.0158
(3.51)
***
0.00758
(5.13)
***
0.0250
(3.80)
***
0.00772
(3.07)
***
Unemployment 0.0267
(3.48)
***
0.00685
(2.23)
**
0.0263
(3.21)
***
0.00697
(2.28)
**
0.0259
(2.44)
**
No degree 0.0288
(5.38)
***
0.00950
(4.87)
***
0.0268
(4.57)
***
0.00963
(4.94)
***
0.0104
(1.51)
0.00519
(1.78)
*
Long-term
unemployment
0.014
(2.67)
***
0.00689
(3.71)
***
0.00696
(3.84)
***
0.0268
(3.57)
***
Liquidities 0.00385
(3.23)
***
0.00201
(4.85)
***
0.00277
(2.18)
**
0.00202
(4.88)
***
0.00487
(2.18)
***
0.00249
(2.92)
***
Agriculture 1.227
(2.79)
***
0.815
(4.22)
***
1.533
(3.02)
***
0.838
(4.32)
***
1.212
1.63
0.696
(2.09)
**
Border 0.0361
(2.61)
**
0.126
(2.83)
***
0.0389
(2.72)
***
0.0362
(1.62)
Naturalized 
Frenchmen
1.68
(4.18)
***
1.819
(4.53)
***
System
weighted R2
Number
of observations
0.7047
93
0.6779
93
0.6957
47
The figures in parentheses below the estimated coefficients are the t-values. An asterisk means that the variable 
has a significant influence at the 90% level of confidence (two asterisks: 95%, three asterisks: 99%). R2 is the 
coefficient of determination.
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The finding that when the share of naturalized nationals is introduced in the set of 
explanatory variables, the share of the population that has been living in the same department 
for at least ten years becomes insignificant suggests a strong collinearity between them. We 
subsequently used the former as a substitute for the latter. The results of that estimation are 
displayed in estimation (13) of table 5. Here again, it appears that the share of naturalized 
Frenchmen was not significantly associated to the share of yes votes, but that our main results 
are little affected. The only striking difference with previous estimations is that the rate of 
long-term unemployment now fails to be significant, but all the other coefficients remain 
stable.
Our final robustness check was to make sure that our results were robust to using sub-
samples. We therefore ran our estimation on a sample of departments consisting only of those 
whose number is uneven, which left us with 47 observations.10 The results of the estimation 
on that sample is given in estimation (14) of table 5. It can be easily verified that the 
coefficients estimated on that sample are very close to those obtained with all departments.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The Maastricht treaty was by all accounts a milestone in the history of European 
integration. Following the Danish “no” to the treaty, the results of the French referendum 
were of paramount importance. Indeed, a French disapproval might well have brought the 
process of European integration to a halt. Such a scenario did not materialize but the results 
were, somewhat unexpectedly, close.
This paper’s red thread is that the French referendum can be interpreted as a 
consultation on monetary union, and that our knowledge of the distributive implications of 
monetary integration can be improved by studying voting behaviour and abstention at the 
level of departments. We did so by applying a minimum chi-square model to the approval and 
abstention rates in French mainland departments, thanks to a weighted SURE method. Two 
chief conclusions emerge from that econometric exercise.
First, it appears that, as expected, the economic characteristics of departments do a 
good job in predicting voting behaviour. The results are moreover consistent with predictions 
based on the theory of monetary integration. Thus, it appears that departments where 
10
 In France, departments are officially referred to either by their name or by their number, which follows the 
alphabetical order. Number one is for instance Ain and Yonne is 89. The only exceptions are the metropolitan 
departments whose numbers range from 90 to 95, which were created after the others, and are mainly located in 
the Paris area. Focusing on uneven-numbered departments is therefore equivalent to a random draw.
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unemployment, long-term unemployment, and the share of the population that does not hold a 
degree are high tended to oppose ratification.
On the other hand, departments whose residents seem less mobile, and where the share 
of gainful employees in the agricultural sector was larger, provided more support to the treaty. 
Those a priori disconcerting results can be easily explained once one recognizes that past 
mobility may be the result of a low exposure to macroeconomic adverse shocks, and that 
farmers are indeed producers of tradable goods, thereby benefiting from a reduction in 
exchange rate risk.
Second, the results for the participation rate seem more disconnected from the 
question asked in the referendum. In fact the main variable accounting for differences in 
participation across departments is the average rate of participation. This finding points 
toward more fundamental determinants of the participation rate, or toward models based on 
learning. This is in itself an interesting result. However, this finding also warrants further 
research, because the significance of average abstention in our regressions can be interpreted 
as a measure of our ignorance about the deep causes of participation.
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